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Abstract  
This study contributes to capital structure literature by investigating the determinant factor of financing decision 
of firms operating in 13 African countries with different financial, institutional, legal and economic environments.  
We employed categorical analysis so as to investigate the factors that influence the financing decision of firms 
operating in countries with underdeveloped and developed stock and banking sector. We also test in this study the 
pecking order and trade off theory is more statistically powerful in explaining firms’ financing decision of those 
African countries and the result confirms both pecking order and trade off theory. Our study found that asset 
tangibility, financial distress cost, profitability and Non debt tax shield are strong firm specific determinants of 
capital structure.  This study also found that corporate tax rate, banking sector development, GDP growth rate, and 
lending interest rate are the most important country specific determinants of capital structure. Rule of law is found 
to be strong determinants of capital structure of African firms.  
Keywords: Africa, Capitals structure, Country’s legal system, Country specific determinants, Pecking order 
theory, Trade off theory   
 
1. Introduction  
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), numerous literatures have been documented 
regarding theoretical and empirical studies of investigating the determinant factors of capital structure. The 
Modigliani–Miller theory (MM theory) states that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric 
information, and in an efficient or perfect capital market, firm’s value is independent of  how it is financed, 
regardless of whether firm’s capital comprises of equities or debt, or both, or what the dividend policy is. However, 
when one or more of the MM assumptions such as perfect capital markets and tax are relaxed, many economists 
have shown how firm value may vary with changes in the debt-equity mix that leads to introduction alternative 
theories.  Accordingly, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduced static theory which assumes that the optimal debt 
level is a result of a trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and financial distress costs. According to this 
theory, the optimum capital structure does exist and a firm is considered as adjusting a target debt level and 
gradually moving towards it. The firm’s optimum capital structure will encompass the trade-off between the effects 
of corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, etc.  On the other hand, the pecking order 
theory, first introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984), states that there is no well-defined target debt ratio rather 
choose retained earnings as their main source of funds for investment followed by less risky debt and risky external 
equity financing. Such preference of using internal funds for investment financing is due to the existence of the 
asymmetric information problem in credit market. Several empirical studies have confirmed the basic Myers–
Majluf idea, such as Brennan and Kraus (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Krasker (1986), Heinkel and 
Zechner (1990), Narayanan (1988), and Noe (1988). 
Moreover, previous researchers investigated the determining factors of the capital structure and identified 
firm size, profitability; growth opportunities and tangibility of assets are the most important firm specific 
determinants of firm’s capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Anders Kjellman And Staffan Hansin, 1995; 
De Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Joshua Abor, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera 
Deressa, 2016). Similarly, the empirical studies on capital structure have also involved examining the 
macroeconomic or country-specific variables (Guihai Huang and Frank M. Song, 2006; De Jong et al., 2008; Cook 
and Tang, 2010; Chipeta and Mbululu, 2013, Ebenezer Bugri Anarfo, 2015) and institutional factors (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2006; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014, Jian Chen Chunxia Jiang Yujia Lin, 2014) that 
influences the choice of firm leverage. Besides, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argued that a country’s legal system 
plays an important role in the development of financial markets, as it influences the establishment of shareholder 
and creditor rights. Thus, such additional country-specific factors should be considered in studies concerning 
capital structure as they play a significant role in explaining disparities in leverage (De Jong et al., 2008). 
However, even if firm-level and country-specific factors have significant impact on firms’ capital structure it 
has not been that much investigated, particularly in the context of firms in the emerging stock markets of Africa. 
Previous studies ignored this area, primarily due to the following reasons. First, the emerging stock markets of 
Sub-Saharan Africa were perceived as irrelevant relative to other more developed African stock markets such as 
the Egyptian, Kenyan, Nigerian and South African stock exchanges (Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, 
2016). Hence, previous studies on capital structure in Africa has inclined to emphasis on more developed stock 
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markets of Africa (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2009; Auret et al., 2013; Chipeta and Mbululu, 2013; Jooma and Gwatidzo, 
2013). Second, the lack of availability of data for firms listing on to these stock markets posed challenges to 
researchers to conduct research on the area. However, currently the extent of the stock market in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been growing in the number of domestic firms listing and in the total market capitalisation of shares 
listed (Chimwemwe Chipeta Chera Deressa, 2016).  Due to the availability of credible data on stock markets for 
these countries, now, it is possible to conduct studies on how firm and country-specific variables influences on the 
choice of leverage for firms in Africa. Moreover, the previous empirical studies were conducted either in the 
countries where the stock market is relatively developed (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2009; Auret et al., 2013; Chipeta 
and Mbululu, 2013; Jooma and Gwatidzo, 2013) or in Sub-Sahara African countries (Chimwemwe Chipeta and 
Chera Deressa, 2016). None of the above studies consider both Sub-Saharan Africa and Non Sub-Saharan Africa 
in this regard. This study therefore, investigated the factors that determine the firms’ financing decision in both 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Non Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study, we used firm specific and country specific variable 
and we also include the country’s legal system and institutional proxies so as to investigate what determine the 
firms’ financing decision in Africa. The inclusion of such proxies is inspired by the institutional difference 
hypothesis which suggests that institutional differences create unique business environments that have influence 
on the way firms behave (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013).  Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, (2016) 
argued that the rule of law, control of corruption are suitable proxies that can impact firm access to capital. 
Similarly, differences in the developments of financial markets and other macroeconomic conditions can impact 
the capacity for firms to contract debt and equity capital. In this study, we perform the categorical analysis based 
on the banking sector and stock market development. We categorized countries as lower, middle and upper as per 
the mean value of the development of banking sector and stock market proxies followed by descriptive statistics 
and regression analysis. The purpose of this categorical analysis is to investigate the relationship of banking sector 
and stock market development with firms’ leverage. We found from this categorical analysis that banking sector 
development has a negative association with leverage of firms in countries where the sector is underdeveloped and 
stock market development has negative relationship with firms’ leverage in countries categorized as lower and 
upper based on stock market development.  Our study confirms both pecking order and static trade of capital 
structure theories. The association of profitability and debt ratio of firms’ in countries categorized as lower and 
middle in both banking sector and stock market development is negative and significant which confirms pecking 
order theory whereas the association of profitability and leverage is positive and significant for firms in relatively 
developed stock market and banking sector in Africa. This result implies that there exist asymmetric information 
and symmetric information in firms in Africa.   
 
2. Theoretical analysis and research hypotheses 
Starting from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), several researchers have introduced theories that 
tried to describe the way firm managers decide on the capital structure of the firms. But, accordingly Barclay and 
Smith (2005) the challenge over the years has been to devise conclusive tests that offer a base for choosing the 
correct theory. For instance, partial adjustment regressions confirmed the static trade-off theory even on data 
simulated according to the pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Such contradiction rises 
because of the methodological weaknesses of partial adjustment models used in several capital structure researches 
(Hovakimian and Li, 2011), and because the theories in some cases presents contradictory expectations on how 
managers choose their capital structure. For instance, the pecking order theory assumes that profitable firms will 
prefer to use their retained earnings, and hence would borrow less. The trade-off theory, to the contrary, suggests 
that profitable firms will try to shield their earning from tax by borrowing more to take advantage of the interest 
tax shields of borrowed money.  Moreover, it is common to find numerous theories of capital structure confirmed 
for the same set of data. Likewise, Chipeta et al. (2012) confirm the static trade-off and pecking order theories of 
capital structure for the same set of JSE listed firms. They found a positive and statistically significant association 
on the target leverage and a statistically significant negative relationship between profitability and leverage.  
Similarly, Barclay and Smith (2005) argue that these theories are mutually exclusive. This study is basically 
designed to test whether trade-off or pecking order theory of capital structure is confirmed in this study.   The next 
part of this study presents the detail of different theories of capital structure of firms. 
 
2.1 The pecking order and trade-off theories 
The pecking order theory was first introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984) and suggests that firms usually choose 
internal finance or retaining earing to finance their investment projects and choose debt to equity when their 
retained earnings is not sufficient (Barclay and Smith,2005). Such preference is due to the existence of information 
asymmetry in the credit market and is used to avoid negative influence of asymmetric information that investors 
tend to believe that firms issue equity when stock prices are overpriced and therefore stock prices would fall after 
stock issue is announced.  
The hypothesis of pecking order theory was confirmed by previous empirical studies in the case of negative 
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relationship between leverage and profitability (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Booth 
et al., 2001; Delcoure, 2007; Strebulaev, 2007; Chipeta et al., 2013).  These researchers found that profitable firms 
actually reported a lower debt ratio. On the other hand several previous studies found contradicting result with the 
view point of pecking order theory (Helwege and Liang, 1996; Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
Bessler et al. (2011) documented that information asymmetry is the major factor of dynamic pecking order 
financing behaviour. Yang et al. (2014) examined the signal factor hypothesis which syndicates the estimation of 
the trade-off and pecking order theories. They found that firms with symmetric (asymmetric) information show 
evidence of trade-off (pecking order) financing behaviour. That is, firms with symmetric information choose to 
borrow whereas firms with asymmetric information choose to use their retained earnings to finance their projects.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) used a novel approach to investigate the pecking order against the trade-off 
theory. They investigated financing decisions of 157 US firms in accordance with the pecking order where 
financing is a consequence of the collective need for external funding. They then documented that the pecking 
order theory has more statistical power than the trade-off theory. Similarly, Seifert and Gonenc (2010) explored a 
broader set of 23 emerging market economies’ firms, and they proved that pecking order financing behaviour is 
more powerful in those markets characterised by a high degree of information asymmetry and agency costs. The 
trade of theory dated back to the study of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) who coined the interest tax shields related 
with debt and the costs of financial distress into a state preference model. This theory states that firm managers try 
to balance the benefits of interest tax shields against the present value of costs of financial distress. There are 
numerous assumptions of the trade-off theory; first, the theory assumes that firms will pursue an optimum capital 
structure, and they will eventually adjust towards the optimum target. Graham and Harvey (2001) documented that 
many of the surveyed chief financial officers in their survey stated that they have a target debt ratio. Second, the 
trade-off theory argued that profitable firms with fewer non-debt tax shields will issue more debt in order to shield 
their profits from tax (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980).  However, majority of previous studies on profitability and 
leverage does not confirm the trade-off theory. Hence, we expect the firms’ profitability will negatively affect the 
firms’ financial leverage in Africa which leads to the following hypothesis.  
H1: Profitability has significant and negative relationship with firms’ leverage 
 
2.2 Contracting cost theory 
Contracting costs of debt comes from the underinvestment problem as it is stated by Myers (1977). A high growth 
firm that is facing challenges in servicing its debt may be forced to sacrifice its capital and investment opportunities. 
Equity investors may be reluctant to invest their funds as they worry that the funds may be used to support the 
creditors’ position (Barclay and Smith, 2005). Hence, such investors will need a higher return for compensating 
the risk of investment. Thus, to alleviate the adverse impact of the underinvestment problem, higher growth firms 
with intangible assets are probably avoiding issuing debt. 
Several empirical studies have been conducted to test the contracting cost theory using numerous measures 
for growth. Adam and Goyal (2008) documented the market to book value of assets has the highest information 
content in relation to investment opportunities. Many empirical studies also used assets and sales as a measure of 
growth opportunities of firms and we also used sales growth to asset growth ratio as a measure of growth 
opportunities of African publicly listed firms in this study.  The result of empirical studies with respect to relation 
between growth opportunity and leverage is mixed. For example, Ozkan, 2001; Ngugi (2008); Frank and Goyal, 
(2009); Jooma and Gwatidzo, (2013), found that there is a negative relationship between growth opportunity and 
firms’ capital structure whereas Abor and Biekpe, (2005); Chipeta et al., (2013) found positive relation between 
the two variables. On the other hand, Delcoure (2007) investigated capital structures of firms in Western European 
transition economies and found statistically insignificant relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
This contradiction in the set of results is reasonable. Myers (1977) point out that growth firms require external 
financing to support their operations.  Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) stated the negative impact of altering the 
arrangement of new issues can be alleviated by the positive impact of future growth opportunities, even under 
asymmetric information. 
Despite, creditors will be capable to facilitate credit to firms that experience real growth in sales and assets. 
Some studies that used asset as measure of growth opportunities found a positive correlation between growth 
opportunities and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Abor and Biekpe, 2005). Hence, the following hypothesis 
was developed in this study.  
H2: Asset tangibility has positive and significant association with firms’ leverage in Africa.  
 
2.3 Institutional determinants of capital structure 
Several empirical studies documented institutional factors influence the choice of capital structure (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Boothet al., 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004, Fan et al. 2012; Chimwemwe Chipeta 
and Chera Deressa, 2016). In Underdeveloped, weak, uncompetitive financial system firms face huge challenges 
to access capital that leads firms to have limited access to debt.  Fan et al. (2012) found that firms have lower debt 
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ratios in countries that are corrupt, and weaker legal systems. Similarly, Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, 
(2016) documented determinants of capital structure of Sub Saharan African countries and found that development 
of banking sector, stock market, and strong legal system  have strong influence on the choice of capital structure. 
For instance, they found that firms in countries with relatively developed stock market reported the lowest debt 
ratio as firms operating in such environment have alternative sources of capital in the form of equity, however, 
firms operating in underdeveloped stock markets more depend on debt because of the limited financing alternatives 
available in these countries. Also, De Jong et al. (2008) documented the influence of collateral value of assets is 
low in countries with relatively developed bond markets. Their result also shows that firms in countries with strong 
legal systems rely more on long-term debt. Moreover, Tchuigoua (2014) investigated the external financing need 
of the micro finance institutions that considers creditor rights, the legal system and the development of the banking 
sector and found that the development of the banking sector is positively associated with external borrowings for 
micro finance institutions. These lead to the following hypothesis in this study.  
H3: Banking sector and stock market development has positive relationship with firms’ leverage in Africa.  
 
2.4 Country-specific determinants of capital structure 
2.4.1 GDP 
Besides the firm specific factors documented in previous studies of capital structure, the country level factors such 
as GDP growth rate, inflation rate and interest rate have a significant influence on the choice of leverage of firms. 
For example, various studies conducted to evaluate the impact of GDP growth rate on capital structure found a 
mixed result. Booth et al (2001) documented the capital structure of developing countries and found that real 
economic growth tend to increase the overall debt ratio and long-term debt ratio of firms. Similarly, korajaczyk 
and Levy (2003) investigated the capital structure optimal, macroeconomic situations and financial constraints it 
has been found that macroeconomic conditions account for 12% to 51% of the time series variation of firms 
leverage financing decisions and reflect the state of the economy in turn indicating that economic growth positively 
affecting the leverage of firms.  On the other hand, Gajurel (2005) used macroeconomic variables to investigate 
the impact of GDP growth rate on the capital structure of Nepalese firms and it has been found that GDP growth 
rate was negatively associated with leverage of Nepalese firms.  Cook and Tiang (2008) documented that firms 
adjust to target leverage faster in good states than in bad states. Based on this, we developed the following 
hypothesis.  
H4: GDP growth rate has significant effect on firms leverage in Africa. 
2.4.2 Interest rate  
Interest rate especially lending rate as it is considered as cost of borrowing is the most important determinants of 
the choice of capital structure of firms. Myers and Steward (1984), prevailing interest rates are of much worry to 
many firms, because of indexing of interest rates to inflation and previous studies revealed that it affects the capital 
structure decision of firms.  Jalilvand and Harris (1984) study US corporations’ capital structure and found that 
the financial decision of US firms is independent of interest rate.  The higher interest rate leads investment to falls, 
a low rate of interest lead to increase in investment (Singh, 1993). Increasing in investment is an indication of 
using more debts. However, in the short run, interest is inelastic and fails to affect investment. In this study, we 
use the lending interest rate and expected to have strong association with debt ratio of firms in Africa and we 
expect the following relationship of lending interest rate and firms’ leverage in Africa.  
H5: Higher interest rate negatively associated with firms’ leverage. 
2.4.3 Inflation  
Another important macro -economic variable that may have significant influence is inflation. Low or medium 
levels of inflation in a particular country may have positive influence on the business activities, in that it can be 
considered as an encouragement to production. High levels of inflation however can adversely influence firm’s 
profitability by directly influencing the cost of raw materials and by reducing final demand for the products. 
Dammon (1988) stated that inflation influences capital structure decision and firm value and further stated that 
higher inflation leads investors to sell bonds in exchange to stocks and firms capital structure measured as debt-
equity mix tend to drop.  Similarly, Frank & Goyal (2009) and Jõeveer (2013) found that inflation rate has a 
positive association with firms leverage as in higher inflation firms can repay debt easily due to the greater pricing 
power and higher return. To the contrary, Booth et al. (2001), Gajurel (2005), Beck et al. (2008) and Muthama et 
al. (2013) found negative association between inflation and firm’s capital structure. Based on Beck et al. (2008), 
Camara (2012), Muthama et al. (2013) and Chipeta & Mbululu (2013), we use the annual percentage of Inflation, 
GDP deflator to measure inflation in this study and we expect the following relationship between inflation and 
firms’ leverage.   
H6: Inflation has positive and significant relationship with leverage of firms in Africa.  
 
2.5. Countries legal system  
It has been argued that differences in a country’s legal system plays a vital role in helping access to debt and equity 
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capital by protecting the rights of lenders and borrowers. Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, (2016) stated 
that the rule of law, and control of corruption are suitable proxies that can impact firm access to capital.  The 
market paricipants in every country may rely on the strong legal system of the country and we expect that strong 
legal system will have a positive effect on firms’ capital structure. This will lead to the following two hypothesis.  
H7: Control of corruption is positively and significantly associated firms’ leverage in Africa 
H8: Rule of law is positively and significantly associated firms’ leverage in Africa 
 
3. Data sources and Methodology  
3.1 Data sources  
This study has been conducted on capital structure determinants of publicly listed non-financial firms of 13 African 
countries namely South Africa, Mauritius, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia, Tanzania, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Botswana. The inclusion of these countries in this study is guided by the 
availability of the required data for firms in these countries. Based on the availability of data, again, this study is 
delimited from the year 2000 to 20015. Hence, a 16 years panel data of 254 publicly listed non-financial firms are 
used for this study. This offers an adequate sample to compare the leverage between countries of emerging and 
developed stock markets and banking sector. The firm level data is extracted from BVD Osiris, data for country 
specific variables are obtained from World development indicators and data for institutional development 
indicators are obtained from World Governance indictor and Doing business. Financial firms such as banks and 
insurance companies are excluded from this study on the ground that they are subject to specific and strong 
regulation that has impact on their capital structure.  
 
3.2 Estimation techniques and variables description  
In this study, we employed descriptive statistics followed by   regression analysis and we also employed categorical 
analysis based on the stock market and banking sector development.  The purpose of this study is to examine the 
determining factors such as firm specific, institutional development and Macro-economic variables. Hence, to 
achieve this objective, the following econometric model is developed for this study.  
,, = 	 + ,, + ,, + ,, + ,,  
Where , denotes an individual firm,   represents the country and   denotes time whereas ,,   is the 
dependent variable measuring the total debt ratios,   ,, is the vector of firm-specific variables, and ,, the 
vector of country specific variables, 	 denotes constant,  	,			 	and 	  denotes coefficients and ,,  is the 
error term. The variables with its measurement and sources are presented in table 1.  
Table 1: Variables description and measurement 
 
 
4. Data analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The mean value of firm level, country specific variables and country’s legal system indexes are presented in table 
2 below (figures in bracket are standard deviation). Particularly, the mean value of firm specific variables is 
presented on panel A of table 2. The mean value the overall debt ranges from 0.36 for firms in Botswana to 1.24 
for firms in Nigeria. The mean value of Asset tangibility ranges from 0.41 for firms in Ivory Coast to 1.49 for 
firms in Nigeria. The minimum mean value of financial distress cost have been scored by the firms in Nigeria 
which is -0.14281 and the highest mean value of financial distress cost has been obtained for firms in South Africa 
which is 0.57. The mean value of growth opportunity ranges from -25.9 for firms in Egypt to 4.48 for firms in 
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Mauritius.  Firms in Namibia have been found more profitable with the mean value of 0.12 whereas firms in Ghana 
have been found less profitable with the mean value of 0.035 of profitability.  The mean value of non -debt tax 
shield ranges from -0.062 for firms in Namibia to -0.016 for firms in Mauritius. The mean value of country specific 
and legal system variables have been presented on panel B of table 2. Accordingly, Mauritius has the lowest mean 
score of corporate tax rate which is 19.84 whereas South Africa has been found to have the highest mean value of 
corporate tax rate which 34.82.  With respect to control of corruption, Nigeria is found to have the lowest mean 
value (-1.13) whereas South Africa has been found to have the highest mean value (0.23). Mauritius has the highest 
mean of rule of law whereas Ivory Coast is associated with the lowest mean value of rule of law. The mean value 
of banking sector development has been found lowest in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Swaziland, Nigeria, and Tanzania 
and is highest in Mauritius, morocco and Egypt.  In the case of stock market development, South Africa has been 
found the top with the mean value of 196.16 and Tanzania has been found the least with the mean value of 3.86. 
Nigeria has achieved the highest growth rate with the mean value of 7.54 whereas Tunisia obtained the least 
economic growth rate of 3.08 on average. Ghana scored the highest inflation rate of 23.32 on average and the 
lowest inflation rate has been scored in Morocco, Ivory Coast, and Tunisia. Finally, the mean value of interest rate 
ranges from 6.02 in Morocco to 18.68 in Ghana. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of firm level, country level and legal system variables 
Panel A: firm specific Variables     
Country  
TD 
TAN 
 
FZ FDC Growth  PROFIT  NDTs 
South Africa  
  
0.522358 
(0.323301) 
0.530102 
(0.2432) 
5.79434 
(0.784757) 
0.573022 
(6.939598) 
0.911528 
(32.84306) 
0.049344 
(0.540453) 
-0.04092 
(0.082746) 
Mauritius 
0.4645099 
( 0.2316383) 
.675581 
( .2366017) 
5.75555 
( .6168475) 
.1385536 
(.2464544) 
4.481299 
(26.44054) 
.0586893 
( .0761605) 
-.015805 
( .032092) 
 Egypt 
 
0.474169 
(0.268492) 
0.512386 
(0.218039) 
5.661396 
(0.673427) 
0.068079 
(0.098939) 
-25.912 
(383.6057) 
0.067884 
(0.080558) 
-0.0219 
(0.030869) 
Nigeria 
  
1.23954 
(16.6272) 
1.498108 
(23.85397) 
5.930317 
(0.804829) 
-0.14281 
(16.64843) 
8.229258 
(171.4232) 
0.110425 
(3.671178) 
-0.02196 
(0.022573) 
Kenya 
  
0.521986 
(0.192945) 
0.673781 
(0.242309) 
6.210758 
(0.699378) 
0.114641 
(0.154097) 
1.232044 
(14.28069) 
0.059093 
(0.133354) 
-0.02856 
(0.018576) 
Morocco 
0.5741717 
(.8683725) 
.4696878 
(.206807) 
5.476719 
(.3950513) 
.0890526 
(.1336795) 
1.328237 
(8.015054) 
.1120202 
(.1709195) 
-.0557652 
(.0626938) 
Tunisia 
0.391818 
(0.2474528) 
.4440086 
(.1902961) 
4.760089 
(.4612767) 
.1033518 
(.1440343) 
-1.055417 
(24.01737) 
.0575104 
(.1061632) 
-.0489717 
(.0810561) 
Tanzania 
  
0.545213 
(0.234141) 
0.674768 
(0.099777) 
7.489842 
(0.663951) 
0.17129 
(0.103655) 
0.960678 
(4.633571) 
0.099293 
(0.178043) 
-0.04813 
(0.01855) 
Namibia 
  
0.461886 
(0.067757) 
0.541918 
(0.049733) 
5.068707 
(0.190201) 
0.081068 
(0.036769) 
1.51423 
(1.871775) 
0.116406 
(0.053603) 
-0.06246 
(0.022343) 
Swaziland 
  
0.46059 
(0.097644) 
0.76267 
(0.047294) 
5.321834 
(0.179766) 
0.076928 
(0.042884) 
0.800263 
(2.398221) 
0.06585 
(0.052732) 
-0.06133 
(0.009913) 
Ivory Coast 
  
0.745011 
0.190819 
0.413209 
0.234733 
7.444566 
0.202535 
0.135984 
0.072328 
0.696994 
6.559802 
0.098861 
0.226994 
-0.02795 
0.018026 
Ghana 
  
0.607558 
(0.203847) 
0.481501 
(0.238638) 
3.883412 
(0.846548) 
0.280427 
(0.455736) 
-0.05635 
(7.356784) 
0.035015 
(0.118061) 
-0.0372 
(0.021423) 
Botswana 
0.3660427 
( .1207668) 
.8476216 
( .1333938) 
5.185498 
(.472) 
.221894 
( .1689154) 
2.372667 
(6.856046) 
.0800469 
( .0925901) 
-.0490312 
( .0641148) 
 
  
Panel B: Country specific and Legal system Variables 
Country  Tax Control  Rule  Banking  Private Market  GDP  Inflation  Interest  
South Africa 
 
34.82562 
(3.545785) 
0.230334 
(0.264048) 
0.100694 
(0.050242) 
56.16225 
(4.79184) 
139.4239 
(13.35613) 
196.1633 
(41.86264) 
3.108787 
(1.739086) 
7.018031 
(1.889063) 
11.66797 
(2.452534) 
Mauritius 
19.84375 
(4.886181) 
.4969058 
(.1039598) 
.9503092 
( .0598837) 
83.50922 
(8.542494) 
78.44556 
(15.82951) 
51.43214 
(20.58587) 
4.365583 
(2.043694) 
4.197918 
(2.97379) 
15.10151 
(6.058648) 
 
Egypt 
27.96875 
(9.645084) 
-0.5298 
(0.13028) 
-0.18991 
(0.235725) 
68.48514 
(7.827512) 
43.16664 
(10.84472) 
42.12565 
(22.44579) 
4.155255 
(1.758137) 
9.337001 
(3.982017) 
12.46401 
(0.845388) 
Nigeria 
 
30 
(0) 
-1.13 
(0.138445) 
-1.20356 
(0.152359) 
17.83986 
(5.504844) 
17.06784 
(7.851318) 
15.91477 
(8.460366) 
7.540982 
(7.034315) 
17.02738 
(25.37127) 
18.47007 
(2.633816) 
Kenya 
 
30 
(0) 
-0.96354 
(0.080906) 
-0.86098 
(0.165747) 
34.92749 
(4.026977) 
27.00178 
(3.041917) 
24.30427 
(9.573314) 
4.467236 
(2.335055) 
8.1268 
(5.425089) 
16.08118 
(2.740137) 
Morocco 
30.0625 
(.2424828) 
-.2566894 
( .128548) 
-.1141198 
(.1350253) 
70.63682 
(12.7837) 
55.71814 
(10.7679) 
50.40885 
(20.1659) 
4.458983 
(1.578488) 
1.152051 
(1.314065) 
6.017404 
(2.638732) 
Tunisia 
31.5625 
(3.414312) 
-.0184796 
( .20003) 
-.002961 
(.1455177) 
47.23128 
(4.695478) 
64.53226 
(7.23305) 
14.19182 
(5.075326) 
3.088929 
(2.155896) 
3.701386 
(1.006697) 
7.424273 
(2.016934) 
Tanzania 
 
30 
(0) 
-0.66126 
(0.218437) 
-0.41336 
(0.081892) 
19.63231 
(4.691716) 
9.73247 
(3.174661) 
3.864412 
(0.997078) 
6.60306 
(1.182335) 
10.02061 
(5.407733) 
16.05288 
(1.950429) 
Namibia 
 
33.8125 
(0.394443) 
0.267421 
(0.144652) 
0.173993 
(0.105379) 
43.41556 
(9.21303) 
47.06886 
(3.303656) 
4.028975 
(3.824237) 
4.920882 
(2.705253) 
7.022136 
(4.044051) 
11.41762 
(2.381839) 
Swaziland 
 
27.5 
(0) 
-0.31834 
(0.122108) 
-0.59447 
(0.180786) 
20.9717 
(3.068716) 
18.72133 
(4.5857) 
8.556294 
(1.835983) 
3.263378 
(1.21652) 
7.881021 
(4.269158) 
11.45313 
(2.371562) 
Ivory Coast 
 
25 
(0) 
-0.89371 
(0.304017) 
-1.21198 
(0.298142) 
17.01319 
(3.922977) 
15.49732 
(2.072017) 
20.78325 
(10.71806) 
2.620626 
(4.464124) 
3.222565 
(2.837355) 
7.72 
(0.972495) 
Ghana 
 
25 
(0) 
-0.10339 
(0.129402) 
-0.01498 
(0.079347) 
18.71109 
(2.96114) 
14.49138 
(2.199808) 
7.528998 
(2.40082) 
6.25601 
(2.699242) 
23.32008 
(16.04584) 
18.68495 
(9.273757) 
Botswana 
24.0625 
(1.412787) 
.9046375 
( .161072) 
.6170955 
(.048702) 
33.82151 
(9.561892) 
23.28482 
(5.82426) 
28.53252 
(7.692189) 
4.206753 
(4.25435) 
7.250459 
(5.110524) 
13.68082 
(2.988068) 
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4.2 Correlation  
In order to evaluate the possible level of multi-collinearly, the correlation between explanatory variables which 
are firm specific, country specific and country’s legal system is presented on table 3. Accordingly, the correlation 
of most independent variables is fairly small indicating that there is no serious multi-collinearly problem among 
the independent variables included in this study.  
Table 3: Correlation among variables  
 
 
5. Result  
This part of the study presented the empirical investigation of determinates of firms’ capital structure in Africa. In 
this part we run two different regressions. First, we run OLS regression of all firms so as to reach to the general 
relationship of firm specific variables, country specific variables and countries legal system indexes with firms’ 
leverage in Africa. Second, we run categorical analysis based on the stock market and banking sector development 
of countries in order to reach to the clear insight of the relationship of variables based on institutional differences, 
basically, based on the developmental differences of stock market and banking sector.  
Firm specific determinants: The OLS estimation of firm specific determinants is presented on table 4.  The 
result of this study confirms the trade-off theory that assumes firms with relatively high tangible fixed assets tend 
to use it as a collateral value for external debt. Furthermore, it has been assumed that firms relatively with safe 
tangible fixed assets will suffer less from potential costs of financial distress, and such firms are supposed to 
borrow more. Hence, the relationship between asset tangibility and leverage is found to be statistically significant 
and positive and is as expected which is consistent with several empirical studies (Huang and Song, 2006; De Jong 
et al., 2008; Ezeoha and Botha, 2012).  The relationship between firm size and firm leverage is found as expected. 
Firm size has statistically significant and positive relationship with firms’ leverage, which is also in line with trade 
of theory. Large firms are considered as mature with relatively stable cash flows and can deal for loans on more 
favourable conditions that minimize the possibility of financial distress and is confirmed by this study. This result 
is consistent with previous studies (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Ukaegbu 
and Oino, 2014). According to trade of theory, the costs of financial distress can lead firms to bankruptcy and are 
supposed to borrow less. This assumption of trade off theory is confirmed by this study. There exist negative and 
statistically significant association between financial distress cost and firm leverage. The association between 
growth opportunity and financial structure is also as expected. There exist a positive but insignificant correlation 
between growth opportunity and leverage and this study is in line with the previous study of Titman and Wessels, 
(1988); Abor and Biekpe, (2005). Packing order theory stated that profitable firms usually prefer to use their 
internal source of finance to support their investment and are supposed to borrow less and is confirmed by this 
study. The relationship between profitability of firms and debt ratio is negative and statistically significant. This 
relationship is consistent with the study of Rajan and Zingales, (1995); Shyam-Sunder and Myers, (1999); Booth 
et al., (2001); Delcoure, (2007); Strebulaev, (2007); Chipeta et al., (2013). The trade-off theory argued that 
profitable firms with fewer non-debt tax shields will issue more debt in order to shield their profits from tax. This 
study also hypothesized that there is a positive and significant association between non debt tax shield and firm 
leverage and the result is as expected.  
Country specific factors and country’s legal system: Table 4 also presented the relationship between macro 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.10, No.1, 2018 
 
8 
level variables and firms’ capital structure. Furthermore, the table comprises the relationship between country’s 
legal system indexes and capital structure. The OLS estimation shows that corporate tax rate has statistically 
significant and positive relationship with firms leverage and is as expected.  The relationship between rule of law 
and firms leverage is not as expected in this study. There exists inverse and significant relationship between rule 
of law and leverage in this study indicating that in countries with strong rule of law, firms are tend to borrow less 
and this result is inconsistent with previous studies (De Jong et al. (2008). Banking sector development enhances 
the provision of debt for investment financing and it has been expected in this study that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between banking sector development and leverage; the result is as expected and consistent 
with previous studies of Tchuigoua (2014) and Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, (2016). It has been 
argued that the real economic growth tend to increase the overall debt ratio of firms. Similarly, it has been 
hypothesized in this study that GDP growth rate has a positive relationship with leverage and the result is as 
expected and is consistent with the previous study of Booth et al (2001). Our study found that the lending interest 
rate found to be the most important and strong determinants of leverage of firms in Africa and the result is as 
expected. Finally this study doesn’t found significant relationship between inflation rate, stock market 
development and Domestic credit to private sector.  
Table 4: OLS regression  
TD Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
TAN 6.770478 0.068354 99.05 0.000* 6.636467 6.904489 
SZ -0.42638 0.043726 -9.75 0.000* -0.5121 -0.34065 
FDC -0.00342 0.00754 -0.45 0.65*** -0.0182 0.011364 
Growth  0.000329 0.000222 1.48 0.138** -0.00011 0.000765 
PROFIT  -1.89665 0.080558 -23.54 0.000* -2.05459 -1.73872 
NDTs 1.282345 0.519878 2.47 0.014* 0.263096 2.301595 
 Tax  0.01897 0.007379 2.57 0.01* 0.004503 0.033437 
Control  -0.11698 0.163245 -0.72 0.474** -0.43703 0.203065 
Rule  -0.85425 0.182893 -4.67 0.000* -1.21282 -0.49567 
Bank  0.006654 0.003122 2.13 0.033* 0.000533 0.012775 
Private 0.004638 0.003031 1.53 0.126** -0.00131 0.010581 
Market  -0.00116 0.001425 -0.81 0.417** -0.00395 0.001637 
GDP  0.021041 0.01012 2.08 0.038* 0.001201 0.040881 
Inflation  -0.00227 0.003227 -0.7 0.482** -0.0086 0.004059 
Interest  -0.02856 0.008912 -3.2 0.001* -0.04603 -0.01108 
_cons -1.51657 0.393642 -3.85 0.000** -2.28832 -0.74481 
Number of obs = 4029   
Prob > F = 0.0000   
Adj R-squared = 0.8970    
TD, Total Debt ratio calculated as total liability to total assets; TAN, Asset tangibility calculated as fixed assets to total 
assets, SZ is firm size measured as logarizm of total assets; FDC is financial distress cost determined as standard deviation 
of EBIT to total assets; Growth is defined as Growth opportunity of firms calculated as the ratio of sales growth to assets 
growth; profit is defined as profitability of firms measured as net income over total assets; NDTs denotes Non debt tax 
shield calculated as depreciation expense to total assets, Tax is corporate tax rate, control stands for control of corruption; 
Rule is defined as rule of law’ Bank is defined as the development banking sector development; Private is private sector 
credit to GDP; Market stands for Stock market development, GDP is GDP growth rate, Inflation is inflation rate as 
consumer prices index;  Interest is defined as lending interest rate;  and *,** and ***significant level at 1% , 5% and 10% 
respectively.   
 
5.2 Categorical Analysis  
In this part we categorized countries based on the development of Banking sector and Stock market. Table 6 
presents the categorical regression analysis and we use the mean value of banking sector and stock market 
development indexes for the purpose of grouping. Countries grouped under lower in both banking sector and stock 
market development are those whose mean value of the specified indexes is relatively lower (below 0.2) and 
countries which are categorized under upper are countries with relatively higher mean value (above 0.7), whereas, 
countries categorized under middle are countries with the mean value in between upper and lower categorized 
courtiers (from 0.2 to 0.7).  Table 5 presents the list of countries under each categories. We started by analysing 
the mean of total debt ratio for each category under both banking sector and stock market development. This result 
also shows that firms in countries with relatively developed stock market reported the lowest average debt ratio as 
firms operating in such environment have alternative sources of capital in the form of equity and this result is 
consistent with the previous study of Chimwemwe Chipeta and Chera Deressa, (2016). However, firms in countries 
with lower banking and stock market development reported highest average debt ratio because in underdeveloped, 
weak, and uncompetitive financial system, firms face huge challenges to access capital and use huge debt as a 
source of financing their investment projects.  
As it is presented in table 6, asset tangibility, growth opportunity, financial distress cost, and profitability 
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significantly affect the capital structure of firms in countries categorized as under lower, middle and upper in the 
case of banking sector and stock market development. The association of profitability and debt ratio of firms’ in 
countries categorized as lower and middle in both banking sector and stock market development is negative and 
significant. This result confirms the pecking order theory that states as there exist asymmetric information in credit 
market, firms prefer retained earnings to debt and also shows that firms in lower development of banking sector 
suffers from asymmetric information.  Contrarily, there exist a positive and significant association between 
profitability and leverage of firms in countries where there is relatively developed stock and banking sector 
development which confirms a trade-off capital structure theory. This also shows that information asymmetry is 
not a problem of firms in countries with relative development of banking sector and stock market in Africa.  From 
this, we can say that whatever the banking sector and stock market development is, the capital structure of firms 
in Africa is highly influenced by financial distress cost, profitability, collateral value and growth opportunity.  Firm 
size has strong effect on the capital structure of firms in countries with relatively developed banking sector and 
stock market but not for firms in countries with under developed banking sector.  Non debt tax shield found to be 
strongly associated with leverage of firms in countries under lower, middle and upper categories of Banking sector 
development whereas is insignificantly associated with firms’ leverage in countries categorized as lower and 
middle stock market development. However, Non debt tax shield has strong association with firms’ leverage in 
countries with developed stock market. Corporate tax rate also affects the capital structure of firms in countries 
with lower development of banking sector and lower stock market development.  Rule of law is found to have 
strong relationship with leverage of firms in countries having lower development of banking sector but not have 
such strong relationship in all other cases. Development of private sector to GDP, also have strong correlation with 
leverage of firms in countries with low level of banking sector development. Banking sector development, stock 
market development, GDP, inflation rate, interest rate have no that much strong effect on firms’ leverage in 
countries under all categories.  Hence, we found that asset tangibility, growth opportunity, financial distress cost, 
Non debt tax shield and profitability and firm size are the most significant firm specific determinants of firms’ 
leverage in Africa. We also found from countries legal system indexes, rule of law has a significant determinants 
of firms’ capital structure in Africa. 
Table 5: Category of Countries based on mean of Banking sector and stock development  
Banking sector development 
  Lower score Middle  score Top  score 
  Nigeria 0.13 Botswana 0.33 South Africa 2.33 
  Tunisia 0.134 Egypt 0.518 Morocco 0.97 
  Ghana 0.03 Namibia 0.6 Mauritius 1.07 
  Tanzania 0.058 Swaziland 0.7 Kenya 1.36 
 Ivory Coast 0.084         
Stock market development 
  Tanzania 0.06 Swaziland 0.3 South Africa 0.77 
  Ghana 0.06 Botswana 0.3 Kenya 0.82 
  Ivory Coast 0.09 Tunisia 0.4 Mauritius 0.6 
  Nigeria 0.116 Egypt 0.38 Namibia 0.6 
          Morocco 0.66 
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Table 6: Categorical Analysis 
 
 
6.Conclusion 
This study examined the firm specific, country specific and country’s legal system determinants of capital structure 
of 254 non-financial publicly listed firms of 13 African countries.  The 16 years panel data from the year 2000 to 
2015 has been used in this study. The data sources of this study are World Bank development indicator data base, 
doing business, Global financial development database and world governance indicators. Descriptive statistics 
followed by correlation analysis and OLS regression have been employed in this study. The result of this study 
confirms the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Our study found that asset tangibility, financial distress 
cost, profitability, Non debt tax shield are strong firm specific determinants of capital structure of firms in Africa.  
This study also found that corporate tax rate, banking sector development, GDP growth rate, and lending interest 
rate are the most important country specific determinants of capital structure of non-financial firms in Africa.  
From the legal system indexes, rule of law is found to be strong determinants of capital structure of African firms.  
In this study, we categorized countries as lower, middle and upper based on the level of development of 
banking sector and stock market. Countries categorized as lower has lower mean score of banking and stock market 
development indexes and countries grouped as upper has highest mean score of banking sector and stock market 
development whereas countries grouped as middle has mean score of banking sector and stock market development 
in between countries’ grouped as lower and upper. Based on this category, this study found that the mean value of 
total debt ratio is highest for firms in countries with lower banking sector and stock market development. The 
mean value of the debt ratio also shows a steady increment as we move from middle to upper category in banking 
sector developments. This study also found that asset tangibility, growth opportunity, financial distress cost,   and 
profitability significantly affect the capital structure of firms which are categorized under lower, middle and upper 
in the case of banking sector and stock market development. Firm size has strong effect on the capital structure of 
firms in countries with relatively developed banking sector and stock market but not for firms in countries with 
under developed banking sector. Non debt tax shield found to be strongly associated with leverage of firms in 
countries under lower, middle and upper categories of Banking sector development whereas is insignificantly 
associated with firms’ leverage in countries categorized as lower and middle stock market development. However, 
Non debt tax shield has strong association with firms’ leverage in countries with developed stock market. 
Corporate tax rate also affects the capital structure of firms in countries with lower development of banking sector 
and lower stock market. Rule of law is found to have strong relationship with leverage of firms in countries having 
lower development of banking sector but not have such strong relationship in all other cases. Development of 
private sector to GDP, also have strong correlation with leverage of firms in countries with low level of banking 
sector development. Banking sector development, stock market development, GDP, inflation rate, interest rate 
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have no that much strong effect on firms’ leverage. The result of this study confirms that the capital structure of 
firms is not influenced by only firms’ own characteristics, rather is influenced by institutional differences and 
country specific factors, and thus, the firms’ capital structure decision should consider those institutional and 
country specific factors as well.  This study further suggested that future researchers should do categorical analysis 
by considering the target debt level and speed of adjustment.  
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